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ABSTRACT
Radiation poses known and serious risks to smallsat survivability and mission duration, with effects
falling into two categories: long-term total ionizing dose (TID) and instantaneous single event effects (SEE).
Although literature exists on the topic of addressing TID in smallsats, few resources exist for addressing
SEEs. Many varieties of SEEs exist, such as bit upsets and latch ups, which can occur in any electronic
component containing active semiconductors (such as transistors). SEE consequences range from benign
to destructive, so mission reliability can be enhanced by implementing fault protection strategies based on
predicted SEE rates. Unfortunately, SEE rates are most reliably estimated through experimental testing
that is often too costly for smallsat-scale missions. Prior test data published by larger programs exist, but
may be sparse or incompatible with the environment of a particular mission. Despite these limitations, a
process may be followed to gain insights and make informed design decisions for smallsats in the absence of
hardware testing capabilities or similar test data. This process is: (1) Define the radiation environment; (2)
identify the most critical and/or susceptible components on a spacecraft; (3) perform a search for compatible
prior test data and/or component class data; (4) evaluate mission-specific SEE rates from available data; (5)
study the rates alongside the mission requirements to identify high-risk areas of potential mitigation. The
methodology developed in this work is based on the multi-institutional, National Science Foundation (NSF)
Space Weather Atmospheric Reconfigurable Multiscale Experiment (SWARM-EX) mission. The steps taken
during SWARM-EX’s radiation analysis alongside the detailed methodology serve as a case study for how
these techniques can be applied to increasing the reliability of a university-scale smallsat mission.
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gate accumulates damage from single events.6 At
any rate, various types of SEEs exist, and their impacts range from benign to mission-ending. Definitions of acronyms, terms, and common SEEs are
provided below as background to the subject of SEE
analysis.

1 INTRODUCTION
Radiation poses known and serious risks to
smallsat survivability and mission duration, with
effects falling into two broad categories: longterm/cumulative total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD) effects, and single event effects (SEE), which occur spontaneously at a statistical rate. While the severity of both types of radiation effects are dependent on environment and
lifetime, TID is an accruing, long-term effect while
SEEs are independent, probabilistic effects. Increased shielding, while a foundational technique, is
not a comprehensive one; shielding increases a spacecraft’s resiliency to TID, but particles that are energetic enough to induce SEEs often have enough energy to penetrate any reasonable amount of shielding for a small satellite. Hence, mission reliability
can be enhanced by implementing fault protection
strategies based on predicted SEE rates.
Although detailed prior literature exists on the
process of addressing TID in smallsats,1 few resources exist for addressing SEEs, as a comprehensive SEE analysis typically requires far more resources than a smallsat program has access to (although examples of smallsats designed with SEE
hardening in mind do exist2–4 ). The approach outlined in this paper is intended to guide programs
with small satellites in low-Earth orbit that have
limited finances, time, and/or access to experts.
Cognizant of these limitations, this paper outlines
a process that can be used to make informed design
decisions for smallsats in the absence of the resources
necessary to launch a full investigation of SEEs. The
techniques outlined in this paper were developed to
address radiation concerns for the NSF SWARM-EX
mission.

• MOSFET: Metal-oxide-semiconductor fieldeffect transistor. MOSFETs are insulated-gate
field-effect transistors that serve as the building block of most modern microelectronics.
MOSFETs require the insulation of a conductive gate from the bulk silicon of the device
via an oxide layer. Radiation commonly affects the oxide and bulk silicon of MOSFETs,
hence susceptibility of a device to radiation effects arises at the level of this silicon architecture/topology.
• CMOS: Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor. A device in which logic gates are
built from networks of n- and p-type MOSFETs which are connected to common voltage
rails and coexist on the same silicon substrate.
The continual scaling down of these structures
(as predicted by Moore’s law) has enabled the
fabrication of increasingly powerful computers;
as a result, many modern integrated circuits
(ICs) rely on CMOS architecture. Because of
their reliance on MOSFETs, CMOS devices
are particularly vulnerable to SEEs.
• Single effect upset (SEU): Upsets occur
when radiation deposits sufficient charge to induce a change of state in a memory bit. A radiation event that triggers multiple bit flips may
be referred to as a multiple bit upset (MBU) or
block error. Resetting or rewriting the affected
bits generally normalizes behavior.

2 BACKGROUND TERMS
• Single event latchup (SEL): Latchups occur when radiation deposits enough charge in a
CMOS device to enable a parasitic thyristor to
activate inside the silicon of the device. This
results in a short circuit between power and
ground that self-heats and can burn a hole in
the device if left unmitigated. Power cycling
the affected device generally normalizes behavior, provided it is done rapidly enough.

SEEs are spontaneous, independent events in
which a circuit is affected by charge deposition from
energetic particles. SEEs occur in any electronic
component containing p-n junctions, which is to
say any active semiconductors (such as transistors).
Many SEEs are one-time events which require a
fundamentally different strategy for addressing than
TID, in which shielding is usually used to slow cumulative effects (shielding does very little to reduce
SEEs). That said, some minorly destructive SEEs
may not be catastrophic at first, but can accumulate
to a major effect. Two examples of this are microdose/microdisplacements in transistor substrates,5
and transistor gate leakage current increasing as the
Oh

• Single event burnout (SEB): Burnouts occur when an ion strike triggers parasitic bipolar action, resulting in high current in a power
transistor and can result in catastrophic failure
of the component.
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• Single event gate rupture (SEGR): One
mechanism for gate rupture is charge deposition from a heavy ion that forms a conducting
path in the gate oxide. Another mechanism
is the formation of charge tracks which collapse the depletion region of a MOSFET, resulting in excessively high fields suddenly becoming present in the gate oxide. Either mechanism results in a MOSFET being flipped into
a permanent-on state. Power MOSFETs are
particularly prone to SEGRs, which can induce catastrophic failure of the transistors in
a similar mode to SEL.

larger-budget programs exist but are often sparse or
irrelevant to the specific application of the particular
smallsat mission. Detailed guidelines for identifying
acceptable prior test data are given in section 6.2.
The techniques discussed in the remainder of this
paper are directed to address the needs of resourcelimited teams, such as university smallsat programs,
that wish to enhance mission reliability by addressing SEEs in their radiation strategies without the
budget or time to support experimental testing.
3 EVALUATING THE RADIATION HAZARD

• Single event transient (SET): A transient
refers to a disturbed output signal or waveform from a device, such as a momentary voltage spike or dropout from a voltage regulator.
SETs tend to resolve on their own, but can
give rise to system-level functional interrupts
if downstream devices are affected by the disturbance.

The first step in evaluating any radiation effect
is to evaluate the radiation environment defined by
mission requirements. Numerous tools exist to aid
in this process including ESA’s SPENVIS, TRAD’s
OMERE, STK’s SEET, and NASA’s RGENTIC,
with previous literature on the topic of smallsat radiation assurance providing instructions for and comparisons between these tools.1, 7, 8 In general, however, radiation environment software tools are simply front-end interfaces for the same set of underlying particle and magnetic field models, so it is simply the user’s preference of front end interface and
control detail as to which tool to use. These radiation environment modeling software generate a common set of output graphs/data useful for evaluating
TID and SEE. The SWARM-EX team chose to use
TRAD’s OMERE because of prior experience using
the interface and option to select particular particle
and radiation models.
The most common set of outputs from environment modeling software include particle flux and linear energy transfer (LET) spectra graphs, examples
of which are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Particle flux
graphs show the intensity of particular types of particles as a function of energy level and are generally
reported as integral or differential flux. These quantities are:

• Single event functional interrupt (SEFI):
A functional interrupt refers to a loss-offunction of a device and may manifest at a
system level, such as an avionics system passing a data error initially triggered by a SET
or MBU. A power cycle can often restore functionality.
• Radiation hardness assurance (RHA): A
holistic approach to mitigating radiation effects in which mission and system requirements drive component and mitigation selection. The process begins by establishing mission requirements. Next, radiation hazards are
determined by modeling the radiation environment defined by the mission requirements.
Part selection can then occur, followed by an
evaluation of system robustness to radiation
effects (a common step in this evaluation is
to perform radiation testing on flight model
components). This approach is designed to
both acknowledge and analyze specific components while also taking into account system
and mission-level functionality.

• Integral Flux: the flux of particles with energies that exceed a specified energy threshold
(e.g. all particles with > 1 MeV of energy).9
• Differential Flux: the negative energy
derivative of the integral flux (i.e. −dJ/dE,
where J is the function that describes integral
flux). The negative derivative is taken so as to
produce a positive quantity (as the derivative
of integral flux is negative on its own).10

Smallsat missions with limited resources may not
have access to the necessary tools to complete a
comprehensive RHA analysis, especially in regards
to performing experimental testing on flight model
components. This testing is the most reliable way to
estimate a component’s susceptibility to SEEs, but
generally far exceeds the budget requirements for
smallsat-scale missions. Prior test data published by
Oh

Ultimately, both differential and integral flux
communicate the same information (and all radiation related quantities can be derived from them10 ),
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but a particular form may be more useful in a particular context; for instance, differential flux may
be the quantity directly measured by a spectrometer while integral flux–being an aggregate particle
count–is more useful for assessing space radiation effects. The SWARM-EX mission has a 500km orbit
at 52.0 degrees inclination. The predicted particle
flux environment for this orbit is shown in Figure
1. When considering electron flux in Figure 1, the
authors note that electrons are not typically a contributor to SEEs, but are a significant contributor
to TID via ionization and Bremsstrahlung effects.

Figure 2: Integral LET spectrum for a 500
km orbit through 1 mm of Al shielding. The
various curves show the levels of transported
particle flux through a specified shielding for
various sets of environment particles.
Because SEEs arise as a result of ionizing energy imparted to a circuit, the LET-flux curve is
the information that connects the radiation environment to hardware SEE susceptibility; LET describes charge deposition within a material, independent of ion species and energy. The LET metric
allows ground based testing (with known charge deposition) to be representative of the space environment.
The other piece of information necessary to estimating an SEE rate is an experimentally derived probability curve, known as a device’s “crosssection,” which relates the number of SEEs to the
fluence of particles at various LET levels when a
component is bombarded by an ion beam. This
curve is unique to every component and is described
in detail in section 6.1.

Figure 1: Average integral and differential
flux for 500 km orbit at 52.0 degrees. The
AP8-MIN (proton worst case) flux is shown
in red and the AE8-MAX (electron worst
case) flux is shown in blue.

Linear energy transfer (LET) is the amount of
energy transferred into a material (through ionization) per unit distance as an ionizing particle travels
through a component.9 As such, LET can be measured in units of energy per distance (e.g. MeV/cm),
but normalizing LET by the material density yields
the more typical unit of MeV×cm2 /mg.1 In this calculation the model inputs a specified radiation environment and determines the environment of particles “transported” behind the shielding, accounting for released energy as particles lose energy to
shielding materials. The LET spectrum graph describes the radiation environment inside the spacecraft and quantifies what level of ionizing energies
the electronic components of the spacecraft will experience. The calculated particle flux environment
for the SWARM-EX orbit behind 1 mm of aluminum
shielding is shown in Figure 2.
Oh

4 IDENTIFICATION OF SUSCEPTIBLE
COMPONENTS
The first step in analyzing system radiation effects is to identify radiation susceptible components
from the mission’s component-level avionics parts
list. To aid in this analysis, we briefly discuss TID
considerations and then present several common associations between families of devices and SEE susceptibility.
• Total Ionizing Dose: CMOS devices are
typically susceptible to long-term effects as a
result of incoming radiation that redistributes
or deposits charges on MOSFET oxides. These
charges accrue, gradually changing the gate
4
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threshold voltage of the transistor. When
the gate threshold voltage becomes critically
low, electrons begin to flow freely through the
transistor. This effectively flips the transistor
into a permanent-on state (SEGRs may cause
this same effect, though instantaneously). An
additional accrued effect of TID is displacement damage (DD), in which radiation physically knocks atoms out of atomic crystal lattices. DD to silicon lattices particularly affects transistors, optocouplers, and other highprecision components that require low voltages
and/or currents. Finally, a variety of nonsemiconductor components are susceptible to
total dose effects.11, 12 Radiation causes DD
to metal crystal lattices and reforms chemical
bonds in plastics, resulting in varying material density, plasticity, and ductility. Thermal blankets, for instance, are particularly
susceptible to increased brittleness and cracking. Electrical components may be susceptible
to charging and experience variations in conductive/insulative properties. Optical components, such as the glass used in camera lenses,
are susceptible to fogging in an effect referred
to as “radiation darkening.” In general, shielding is an effective way to increase the lifetime
of components against TID.1, 7

ditionally, memory devices are susceptible to
”hard errors” in which bits become permanently stuck.13, 14 FRAM memory devices use
ferroelectric capacitors rather than MOSFET
components, and are therefore much less susceptible to radiation effects. Nonvolatile flash
memory is much less susceptible to radiation
effects than DRAM, but are still susceptible
to SEU/MBU, which manifest as re-written
memory bits, and SEFI, which can manifest
as read/write lockups. A particular area of
concern with nonvolatile memory are system
bootloaders; if a bootloader does not contain
a rewriting capability, its corruption could result in mission failure.
Additional notional guidance may be found by using
the NASA/Vanderbilt R-GENTIC tool.15 A summary of notional threat identification is shown in
table 1. One additional radiation effect that has not
been discussed appears in table 1: Enhanced Low
Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS) is a change in device
sensitivity parameters on-orbit. For devices susceptible to ELDRS, ground based test results at high
dose rates cannot serve to bound the damage that
occurs.
For small satellites in low Earth orbit, SEU, SEL,
and SET tend to be the most relevant sources of
SEEs necessary for engineering considerations: SEU
and SEL, because memory and CMOS devices see
these effects most commonly; and SET, because it
is a recoverable effect that appears most frequently
in linear and power devices. SEGR and SEB may
also occur (particularly in linear and power devices),
but these tend to be permanently destructive effects,
so it is difficult to implement mitigations besides redundancy.
On the ground, SEU, SEL, and SET can be measured directly during experimental radiation testing,
but it is often difficult to do so directly in space; in
practice, many SEU and SEL events will manifest as
SEFIs at a higher level of the system (e.g. memory
read/write or microcontroller lockups, which may
arise from a variable number of SEEs), so mitigation
strategies should focus on continued spacecraft operability or autonomous detection and self-mitigation
in the event of high-level interrupts to spacecraft
components or subsystems.

• CMOS Devices: CMOS devices, including
microcontrollers and many integrated circuits,
are particularly susceptible to latchup. Most
SELs can be mitigated by a power cycle of the
affected device (as a thyristor will remain stuck
in an on state until power to it is cut), so periodic power cycling may be employed in the
absence of the ability to detect a latchup. Setting thresholds for power cycling will depend
on the estimated rate of latchups in critical
components.
• Power Electronics: Discrete power components, such as power MOSFETs or Schottky
diodes, are particularly susceptible to SEGR
and SEB due to high current loads. In general, SEGR in a power transistor is always destructive. Linear ICs, such as DC-DC converters, most often manifest SETs, such as voltage
spikes or dropouts.
• Memory: Static random access memory
(SRAM) and dynamic random access memory
(DRAM) devices are volatile memory devices
built upon CMOS/MOSFET architecture and
are therefore susceptible to SEU and SEL. AdOh

5 PART REDUCTION FOR ANALYSIS
Reducing the number of parts considered in an
SEE study is important because the process of identifying compatible test data requires detailed com5
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Table 1: Threat susceptibilities for common classes of spacecraft electronics.
Family
Clock/Timing

Examples
Circuit or crystal oscillator, DLL, PLL

Digital

Comparator, discrete flip-flop or logic gate, multiplexer, PWM, receiver
BJT, HEMT, IGBT, JFET, MOSFET, PIN diode,
Schottky diode
Amplifier, attenuator, demodulator, detector, mixer,
modulator, receiver, transmitter
Digital signal processor, FPGA, microcontroller, microprocessor
Charge coupled device, CMOS imager, focal plane array assembly

Discrete Power
Discrete RF/signal
Embedded
Imager

Linear
Memory
Mixed-Signal

Opto-electronics
Power Hybrid

Sensor

Comparator, LDO, op-amp, voltage reference or regulator
SRAM, DRAM, EEPROM, FRAM, MRAM, NAND
or NOR flash, SDRAM
ADC, analog multiplexer/switch, current-mode PWM,
DAC, integrated PWM DC-DC converter, voltagemode PWM
Discrete LED, optocoupler, photodiode
Battery charger, DC-DC converter, load switch, motor
drives, multi-voltage regulator IC, peak power tracker,
power supply
Accelerometer, current, hall effect, pressure, readout
IC, resolver to digital converter, temperature

ponent information which is often difficult to obtain
(hence, analyzing the SEE rate for many components may become debilitatingly time-consuming).
The reduction of the full susceptible parts list may
be done by considering which components are most
critical to the mission being able to achieve the objectives as defined in the mission requirements. This
necessitates system-level consideration (as noted by
the RHA process), as relatively benign failures in
particular components could still result in high level
functional interrupts (and conversely, a hard failure
in a particular component may not considerably disrupt the system’s functionality). Fault tree analysis
(FTA) or failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) may serve as tools to aid in identifying
the most critical components for analysis. An FTA is
conducted from a top-down system approach, while
a FMECA is conducted from a bottom-up system
approach. FTA takes the form of a tree that breaks
a high-level failure into subsequently smaller subsystem failures until reaching the level of individual
components. By contrast, a FMECA begins at the

Oh
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SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, TID
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, TID
SEGR, SEB, TID, DD
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, SEGR, SEB
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, TID
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, SEGR, SEB, DD,
TID, ELDRS
SET, SEB, DD, TID,
ELDRS
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, TID
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, SEGR, SEB, DD,
TID, ELDRS
DD, SEB, SEGR, TID
SEGR, SEB, SET, TID,
DD, ELDRS
SEU/MBU, SEL, SET,
SEFI, SEGR, SEB, DD,
TID, ELDRS

level of individual components and faults caused by
a particular component are traced upwards through
higher levels of the system until a functional interrupt emerges. In theory, an FTA and a FMECA
will “meet in the middle” to form a single structure
in which paths from mission failure can be traced
through various levels of functional interrupts down
to individual components. The components which
cause the highest probability, number, or most critical functional interrupts are the components which
should be investigated.
The SWARM-EX team conducted their part list
down-selection with an FTA. The top level of the
FTA begins with “failure to meet mission objectives,” and the second level specifies critical spacecraft functions per the mission-level requirements.
Each successive level indicates successively lowerlevel faults which could give rise to the higher fault,
and each branch of the tree may be labeled with
“and” or “or,” to specify whether one or all of
the lower-level faults must occur to give rise to the
higher-level fault. An example fault tree, based on
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one used by the SWARM-EX team, is shown in Figures 3 and 4. Blue text indicates a link to a lowerlevel fault tree. Certain component-level failures can
be seen in the right-most column of each FTA; it is
these failures which drive the importance of a component being analyzed for SEEs.

power, mode switching, computation, and communications. For the sake of organization, separate FTAs
were built for each of these subsystems. For power,
some key modes of failure are failure to distribute
power and insufficient or excessive bus power. Ultimately, each of these failure modes can be traced
to the failure of a particular component (or components) in the power subsystem, as SWARM-EX
utilizes single-string architecture. Ultimately the
SWARM-EX team identified 20 components of particular interest and FTA revealed two specific areas
of particularly high risk to mission success: a microcontroller unit (MCU) that serves as the spacecraft’s
main compute element; and a set of DC-DC buck
converters used to set power string voltages from
the supplied battery voltage. These components
were marked as critical to mission success because
the three SWARM-EX spacecraft each have a single
string design (no redundant components), so disruptions to any spacecraft’s MCU or main power line
components would seriously threaten a spacecraft’s
ability to operate. SEE rates for these two components were estimated by identifying prior datasets.

Figure 3: Example high-level FTA for identifying critical components, loosely based on
one used by the SWARM-EX mission.

6 COLLECTING PRIOR TEST DATA AND
EVALUATING RATES
6.1 Mathematical background for the SEE
rate calculation
The final piece of information necessary to evaluate a component’s SEE rate is a function which
relates the amount of particle energy imparted to
a component (the LET) to the probability of that
particle inducing an SEE. Once known, the LETprobability function can be combined with the LETflux curve described in section 3 to relate particle
flux to SEE probability and thus estimate an aggregate SEE rate in a given environment. The following
information about cross-section data and the rate
calculation is provided as background knowledge for
the reader, rather than as an instruction set, as the
aforementioned software tools are generally capable
of performing the curve-fitting and rate calculation.
The LET-probability function must be determined experimentally via component-specific SEE
testing. This testing is performed by exposing a device to a beam of particles with known LET for a
fixed span of time. The number of anomalies that
occur during that time span is measured, as is the
particle fluence (the time-integral of flux, representing the total number of particles that passed through
the component’s area during the test). The probability of an SEE occurring is given by the number

Figure 4: Example of an FTA linked to the
higher-level “failure to supply power” fault
listed in Figure 3.
The objectives of the SWARM-EX mission are
to collect scientific data and demonstrate reconfigurable swarm behavior, so the first level of the FTA
was labeled “failure to meet mission objectives” and
the second listed failure to complete each of those
objectives as high-level functional interrupts, along
with a generic “failure of critical subsystem” fault.
For SWARM-EX, these critical subsystems included
Oh
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over the LET spectra in the following manner:18

of events per unit fluence and is referred to as the
component’s cross-section, a measurement of probability used in particle physics having units of area.9
This is represented mathematically as
σ=

N
N
=R
ϕ
Φdt

AS
N=
×
4
Z Lmax

(1)

Lth

Z

Lmax

Lth

cLW 
Φd (L)D
dLdLW
L
(3)

where σ is the component cross-section, N is the
number of observed events, and ϕ is the particle
R fluence, which is mathematically equivalent to Φdt,
the time-integral of flux. Flux has units of inverse
area and inverse time, so fluence has units of inverse
area, giving rise to the cross-section’s units of area.
Concisely, σ quantifies the probability of a SEE occurring for an interaction with a particle of a given
LET and must be measured experimentally.
During experimental testing a component is exposed to particles at a number of discrete LET levels
to obtain specific cross-section/LET data points. To
obtain a curve, a four-parameter Weibull function is
fit to the cross section data.16 This function takes
the form
S !!

(L − Lth )
(2)
σ(L) = σlim 1 − exp −
W

where Lth and Lmax are the LET threshold and
maximum expected LET, respectively; AS is the surface area of the sensitive volume; d/dLW σ(LW ) is
the differential Weibull distribution; Φd (L) is the
differential flux-LET spectrum; and D(cLW /L) is
the integral chord length distribution of the sensitive volume with depth c. Again, equation 3 is provided only as a reference to the reader; software tools
that employ CREME96 can perform this calculation
automatically given flux-LET spectra data, a crosssection Weibull distribution, and minor information
about the geometry of the component.
6.2 Identifying compatible test data
Component cross-section data can only be collected via experimental measurement; costs to rent a
particle beam for component irradiation can quickly
exceed the budget of a small satellite mission, so it
is most ideal to conduct an SEE rate calculation using prior test data. Unless a component of interest
has extensive flight heritage, however, it is unlikely
that prior test data relevant to both the part and
the radiation environment can be found. As a result, it may become necessary to perform rate calculations on test data from similar components. Because a component’s susceptibility to SEEs arises at
the silicon-topology level, it is never appropriate to
assume that a similar component’s test data is representative of the component of interest. That said,
reusing data is often the only option available to
small satellite programs. To maximize the chance of
a representative rate estimate, a certain set of conditions must be met before moving forward with test
data from a similar component. The similar component should:

where W , S, Lth , and σlim are the fit parameters
and cross-section is a function of LET level, L. W
and S are the Weibull width and shape parameters,
Lth is the LET threshold, and σlim is the limit crosssection of the device. The LET threshold is defined
as the minimum LET at which an SEE is observed;
it is generally assumed that particles below this LET
level are incapable of inducing an SEE in that component, and so σ(L) = 0 for L < Lth .9, 10 The limit
cross-section is the highest probability of an SEE
occurring and manifests as a horizontal asymptote
in the test data. This information is given as background to provide intuition for the shape of the resultant curve fit. In general, as long as the reader can
obtain a number of test data points (cross-section
vs. LET), existing software tools such as OMERE
can perform the Weibull fit. WebPlotDigitizer17 is a
free, web-based tool that may aid in extracting data
points from a graphical plot.
The CREME96 model is used by most computational tools today (e.g. OMERE, SPENVIS) and
calculates SEE rates according to the IRPP (Integrated Rectangular Parallelepiped) model. In this
model the differential particle flux-LET spectrum,
cross-section Weibull distribution, and chord length
distribution of the sensitive volume (assuming a rectangular parallelepiped form factor), are integrated

Oh

d
σ(LW )
dLW

1. Come from the same manufacturer as the component of interest
2. Share the same technology process (e.g. MOSFET technology/process node)
3. Have a similar internal architecture (e.g. two
microcontrollers containing a similar volume of
SRAM)
8
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!

4. Have been tested using the same types of particles likely to be encountered (e.g. heavy ion
testing as an indicator of cosmic ray SEEs)

of SEEs for which datasets are available (e.g. a
net SEE rate may be calculated for a microcontroller by summing an SEU rate and an SEL rate
each calculated from a separate dataset). This process of seeking separate datasets may also provide
insight into the likely failure mode of a particular
component. For instance, the SWARM-EX microcontroller’s SEE rate is dominated by SEL, rather
than SEU. It is important to note, however, that
any aggregate SEE rate calculated in this manner
establishes only a minimum threshold for the component’s SEE rate, and thus should not be taken as
a conservative estimate.
A final metric for consideration is the number of
events likely to be encountered by a particular component during the mission lifetime. This may be calculated by multiplying a component’s SEE rate by
the mission duration. The number of events, SEE
rate, and severity of consequence to the system together may be used by spacecraft designers to decide whether a particular component carries with it
an “acceptable” level of risk, or whether additional
radiation mitigation strategies are warranted.

5. Have been tested under the same operating
conditions as the component of interest (e.g.
at the same supply voltage)
These criteria maximize the chances that a component’s manufacturing process gives rise to a similar
silicon topology as the component of interest, as well
as the chances that a component shares a similar arrangement and distribution of transistor structures
within the component of interest (especially if the
component is a very-large-scale-integrated (VSLI) or
so called system-on-a-chip (SoC) device). Prior test
data can be confidently used for a component manufactured with the same semiconductor mask set and
at the same process node as the component of interest, but oftentimes this information can only be
provided by a manufacturer, if it can be obtained at
all. In the absence of this level of specificity, it may
reasonably follow that components from the same
manufacturer and process node are most likely to
have similar system architecture and silicon topology. However, even if this is the case, the application
conditions of the test may not be representative of
the mission use case (e.g. MOSFET tested passing
up to 10V, but the mission requires 30V operation),
further impeding the use of historical test data. It
is not appropriate to compare prior test data to a
similar component from a different manufacturer,
however, as variance in design and fabrication processes does not guarantee similar component structure. Similar test data may be appropriately used
if it can be determined that the tested component
and the component of interest share the same technology process, but this often cannot be determined
without contacting manufacturers directly. If this is
impossible to do, extensive research may lead an engineer to reasonably infer that a similar component
designed by the same manufacturer in the same year
employs the same technology process. If not enough
similarities between the tested component and the
component of interest can be found (e.g. they have
different manufacturers or technology processes), it
becomes dangerous to assume that the found data
is representative of the component of interest.
An additional consideration is that testing is often performed for a particular SEE (such as only
SEL or only SEU), so it may become necessary to
identify test data for multiple types of SEEs to gain
an accurate picture of the net SEE rate for a particular component. An aggregate SEE rate may be
estimated by summing together the various rates
Oh

6.3 Component-class sweeping
In the absence of any similarity data for a critical component, one may sweep technologies from
the same class of components to identify bounds
on the types and ranges of susceptibilities for the
class. While this does not provide a firm estimate
of SEE rates, it may still provide guidance for system design and effect mitigation. A component-class
sweep was used to gain additional insight into the
SWARM-EX microcontroller. Test data from a similar component made by the same manufacturer was
identified, yielding a rate of 0.3 events/year. This
rate was orders of magnitude larger than other components of interest, so the decision was made to
search for bounds on the microcontroller susceptibility range. Data was found for a variety of microcontrollers without respect for the manufacturer or
technology process, resulting in bounds of 0.0283 to
5179.35 events/year. This wide range of susceptibilities revealed the microcontroller as being a potentially more problematic component than the similarity data alone would suggest. The found datasets
also revealed MCUs as a class of components that are
particularly susceptible to SEL, and subsequently
drove mitigation recommendations to the SWARMEX systems engineering team.
9
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Table 2: Repositories where test data may be found.
Resource
Proceedings of the IEEE
Radiation Effects Data
Workshop
NASA GSFC Radiation
Database
ESA
Radiation
Test
Database
NASA JPL Radiation Effects Database (RAD)

Interface Method
Journal-specific Google Scholar search (recommended), or IEEE
Xplore: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/1000609/
all-proceedings
Searchable online database: https://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/
radhome/raddatabase/raddatabase.html
Searchable online database: https://esarad.esa.int
Searchable online database: https://radcentral.jpl.nasa.gov

6.4 Searching for test data

of these data, general bounds for component susceptibility may be found by sweeping test data for a
large number of components of the same class. It is
important to note that similarity data cannot ever
be assumed to accurately represent a component of
interest, but nevertheless may provide insight into
the general level of susceptibility and types of effects
that may be observed in it. Once a sense of the types
and frequency of SEEs is known for each component
of interest, mitigation strategies may be employed to
prevent faults from propagating in ways that will interfere with fulfillment of mission objectives or cause
failure to meet mission reliability requirements, enhancing the reliability, lifetime, and performance of
small satellite missions.

Test data may be found in a variety of locations,
some of which are summarized in table 2. Test data
published in alternate locations may be located via
Google Scholar searches that include shortened part
numbers as a search term.
The authors note that JPL RAD may not be accessible. Direct correspondence with the JPL RAD
team on July 15, 2021 revealed that the database is
offline indefinitely pending an internal review, but
confirmed that a future relaunch is planned. The
database remains offline as of June 6, 2022.
7 MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Mitigation strategies should be employed anywhere where a fault in a component could give rise to
SEFIs with sufficient frequency or severity to disrupt
a spacecraft’s ability to fulfill its mission objectives.
A wide variety of mitigation strategies exist, but
a thorough description is beyond the scope of this
work. Table 3 lists a variety of common mitigation
strategies for various classes of SEEs, along with references to outside sources which provide greater detail into examples, use cases, and implementations.
8 CONCLUSION
Evaluating total dose effects is generally a
straightforward process enabled by free software
tools, but a rigorous SEE study necessitates component testing which typically exceeds the resources
available to a small satellite program. Despite this
limitation, informed design decisions for smallsats
may still be made by performing rate calculations
from carefully selected prior test data for similar
components. Strategic down-selection of the list
of components included in an SEE study is recommended to reduce the time required to search for
and verify relevant prior test data. In the absence
Oh
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Table 3: Table of common SEEs, mitigation strategies, and external references which may
provide helpful details on implementation schemes.
Single Event Effect
SET
SEU

SEGR/SEB

SEFI
SEL

Common Mitigation Strategies
Voltage/current wave filters; improving configuration current and application voltage
Code checking/error detection and correction (EDAC) algorithms, such as hamming codes; bit or word level instance layer isolation; timing refresh; triple mode redundancy (TMR)
Component derating (especially power components); singlepoint monitoring; hardware redundancy; watchdog monitoring
Reset and refresh; system watchdogs; power cycling; TMR
and voting within embedded systems
Current monitoring; current limiting, such as series resistance; power-cycling schedule/intermittent power supply;
system watchdogs
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